Taliban ideology and its application

The Taliban's extremely strict and anti-modern ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia combining Pashtun tribal codes", or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favored by members of the Pakistani fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) organization and its splinter groups. Also contributing to the admixture was the Wahhabism of their Saudi financial benefactors, and the jihadism and pan-Islamism of sometime comrade-in-arms Osama bin Laden. Their ideology was a departure from the Islamism of the anti-Soviet mujahideen rulers they replaced who tended to be mystical Sufis, traditionalists, or radical Islamicists inspired by the Ikhwan.
Sharia law was interpreted to ban a wide variety of activities hitherto lawful in Afghanistan: employment and education for women, movies, television, videos, music, dancing, hanging pictures in homes, clapping during sports events. One Taliban list of prohibitions included:
pork, pig, pig oil, anything made from human hair, satellite dishes, cinematography, and equipment that produces the joy of music, pool tables, chess, masks, alcohol, tapes, computer, VCRs, television, anything that propagates sex and is full of music, wine, lobster, nail polish, firecrackers, statues, sewing catalogs, pictures, Christmas cards."


Also new were the "religious police" for enforcing these bans, a concept thought to be borrowed from the Wahhabis. In newly conquered towns hundreds of religious police beat offenders -- typically men who shaved and women who were not wearing their burqa properly -- with long sticks. Critics complained that most Afghans were non-Pashtuns who followed a different, less strict and less intrusive interpretation of Islam. Despite their similarity to the Wahhabis, the Taliban did not eschew all traditional popular practices. They did not destroy the graves of pirs (holy men) and emphasized dreams as a means of revelation.
Taliban relationship with ethnicity was mixed. Following Deobandi and Islamist anti-nationalist belief, they opposed "tribal and feudal structures," and eliminated from "leadership roles" traditional tribal or feudal leaders. On the other hand, since they were very reluctant to share power and their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtuns, their rule meant ethnic Pashtuns controlled multi-ethnic Afghanistan, where Pashtuns made up only 42% of the population. At the national level, "all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not. As a result of this loss of expertise, the ministries by and large ceased to function." In local units of government like city councils of Kabul or Herat, Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when the Pashto-speaking Taliban could not communicate with the local Dari-Persian-language-speaking Afghans. (Roughly half of the population of Afghanistan spoke Dari or other non-Pashtun tongues). Critics complained this "lack of local representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force."
Like Wahhabi and other Deobandis, the Taliban strongly opposed the Shia branch of Islam. The Taliban declared the Hazara ethnic group, which totaled almost 10% of Afghanistan's population, "not Muslims."
Along with being very strict, the Taliban were adverse to debate on doctrine with other Muslims. "The Taliban did not allow even Muslim reporters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the Qur'an."
As they established their power the Taliban created a new form of Islamic radicalism that spread beyond the borders of Afghanistan, mostly to Pakistan. By 1998-1999 Taliban-style groups in the Pashtun belt, and to an extent in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, "were banning TV and videos .... and forcing people, particularly women to adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life."

Governance
The Taliban did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:
The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.
Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from "Bay'ah" or oath of allegiance in imitation of the Prophet and early Muslims. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had the "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed", taken from its shrine "for the first time in 60 years." Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the centre of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted `Amir al-Mu'minin`! (Commander of the Faithful), in a defacto pledge of support.
Also in keeping with the governance of early Muslims was a lack of state institutions or "a methodology for command and control," standard today internationally even among non-Westernized states. The Taliban didn't issue "press releases, policy statements or hold regular press conferences," and of course the outside world and most Afghans didn't even know what they looked like since photography was banned. Their regular army resembled "a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force" with only 25,000 to 30,000 men, these being added to as the need arose. Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrassa education." Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts to fight when needed. If and when military reverses trapped them behind lines or led to their death, this created "even greater chaos" in the national administration. In the Ministry of Finance there was no budget or "qualified economist or banker." Cash to finance Taliban war effort was collected and dispersed by Mullah Omar without book-keeping.

Consistency
The Taliban ideology was not static. Before its capture of Kabul members of the Taliban talked about stepping aside once a government of `good Muslims` took power and law and order were restored. The decision making process of the Taliban in Kandahar was modeled on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what was believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the believers.
However, as the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the jirga, and without Omar's visiting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power.
Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.
In 1999, Omar issued a decree stating the Buddha statues at Bamyan would be protected because Afghanistan had no Buddhists, implying idolatry would not be a problem. But in March 2001 this decision was reversed with a decree stating "all the statues around Afghanistan must be destroyed."

Criticism of ideology
The Taliban were criticised not only for their strictness but also for innovation (Bid‘ah). Some Muslims complained many Taliban prohibitions such as the ban on clapping during sports events, kite flying, beard trimming, or sports for women, had no validity in the Qur'an or sharia; that the Taliban called their 20% tax on truckloads of opium "zakat," when zakat is limited to 2.5% of the zakat-payers' disposable income.
The bestowing of the title of Amir al-Mu'minin on Muhammad Omar was criticized on the grounds that he lacked scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the Prophet's family. Sanction for the title required the support of all of the country's ulema, whereas only some 1200 Pashtun Taliban-supporting Mullahs had declared Omar the Amir. "No Afghan had adopted the title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan assumed the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh kingdom in Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners, while Omar had declared jihad against" other Afghans.

Explanation of ideology
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) was important to the Taliban because the "vast majority" of its rank and file and most of the leadership, (though not Mullah Omar), were Koranic students who had studied at madrassas set up for Afghan refugees, usually by the JUI. The leader of JUI, Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman, was a political ally of Benazir Bhutto. After Bhutto became prime minister, Rehman "had access to the government, the army and the ISI" whom he influenced to help the Taliban.
Journalist Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation and hardship of the war against the Soviet Union and the civil war that followed, was another factor influencing the ideology of the Taliban. The young rank and file Taliban were Koranic students in Afghan refugee camps whose teachers were often "barely literate," let alone scholars learned in the finer points of Islamic law and history. The refugee students brought up in a totally male society, not only had no education in mathematics, science, history or geography, they had no traditional skills of farming, herding or handicraft-making, nor even knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.
In such an environment peace meant unemployment, and domination of women was an affirmation of manhood. Rigid fundamentalism was a matter of political survival, not just principle, Taliban leaders "repeatedly told" Rashid "that if they gave women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they would lose the support of their rank and file."